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“As human beings, we are vulnerable to confusing the unprecedented with the 
improbable. In our everyday experience, if something has never happened before, we are 
generally safe in assuming it is not going to happen in the future, but the exceptions can 
kill you and climate change is one of those exceptions.”—Al Gore1 
 
Climate Change is arguably the defining issue of the present era. Humanity’s use of fossil 
fuels since the dawn of the industrial age has brought about unprecedented advances in 
technology, wealth, and well-being. However, there is a price associated with this material 
progress. Unheard of quantities of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses (GHGs) have 
been released into the atmosphere.2 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), “the last three decades [have] been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface 
than any preceding decade since 1850.”3 Over the past few decades, there has also been a degree 
of uncertainty about the relationship between the warming and human activities. Over time, a 
veritable consensus of scientific evidence has concluded that human activities are driving the 
warming of the planet. The issue remains highly politicized, and though some debate continues 
in political circles, there is very little debate in the scientific community relating to the 
fundamental notions of a warming planet and its underlying causes. Presently, any argument 
concerns how much harm is caused by warming, who is responsible for it, and who is 
responsible for mitigating its damage. Some climate skeptics, such as climatologist Dr. Roy 
Spencer, still hold that mild warming is merely a nuisance or may even be beneficial. Groups 
such as the IPPC, on the other hand, warn that the effects of climate change may be self-
reinforcing and catastrophic in scale in the very near future.4 Despite uncertainty, the potential 
economic, environmental, and human consequences of climate change, including possible 
increases in tropical storm activity and rising sea levels, garner global attention.5 
For the past several decades, various entities and institutions ranging from international 
to local in scale have engaged in political and ethical discourse on the topic of climate change. 
The now famous Brundtland Report represents this discussion in its infancy. The report 
published by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 
in 1987 outlined international goals for sustainable development and global cooperation in 
recognition of humanity’s increasingly global impact on the environment.6 Climate change was 
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yet to be a central issue at the time of the report, which focused more on sustainable development 
and conservation in the context of economic equity and progress.   
The report was followed in 1992 by the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The 
Earth Summit continued the sustainability discourse initiated by the Brundtland Report. 
However, in Rio, the issue of climate change took on its now characteristic importance and 
paved the way for an international Climate Change Convention7 in 1997 under the auspices of 
the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is in essence an international treaty intended to place 
binding obligations on member states to reduce GHG emissions. The overarching principle in the 
Kyoto Protocol is the notion of “common but differentiated responsibilities” with respect to 
climate change.8 The idea is that developed nations which have produced the majority of GHGs 
and have benefitted the most from their production should bear the majority of the burden to 
mitigate climate change by reducing GHG emissions and assisting transitioning states.9 
However, of the original 197 nations that attended the convention, only 191 signed and ratified 
the treaty. Notably, two of the largest polluters, the United States and Canada, opted out.10  
It may seem that non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol represents a dubious ethical 
path. Certainly, those developed nations which opted out have received ample criticism for doing 
so. However, with consideration to climate change, the “right” actions are not easily decided 
upon.  
This article will perform a close inspection of the ethical issues surrounding climate 
change. This research shows that climate change is an ethical issue that transcends space, time, 
and culture.  A review of the literature reveals that the ethical implications of climate change are 
highly dependent on scale, perspective, worldview, and a host of intangibles that are difficult to 
measure. In donning a multitude of ethical lenses, this article will illuminate the intractable 
nature of the debates surrounding climate change mitigation and economic development. 
Ultimately, this article will survey the state of ethical discourse on the topic of responsibility 
leading inevitably to a discussion of scale and its role in the ethical schema. 
The complexity of climate ethics can hardly be overstated. In his seminal paper on the 
topic, Stephen Gardner calls climate change the “perfect moral storm.”11 Gardner broadly 
addresses the fundamental moral questions facing the present generation, such as what is the 
global ceiling for carbon? How should the well-being of current generations be weighed against 
that of future generations? Gardner neither answers nor attempts to answer these questions. His 
thesis, however, is that the moral questions presented by climate change are beyond challenging 
and highly susceptible to moral corruption. He observes that the diverse, complicating factors 
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associated with climate change ethics “threaten our ability to behave ethically” due to scope, 
scale, perception, and politics.12 
Gardner’s “storms” converge like those that sundered the Andreas Gale in Sebastian 
Junger’s book The Perfect Storm. The first two storms are composed of the following 
characteristics: Dispersion of Causes and Effects, Fragmentation of Agency, and Institutional 
Inadequacy. The Global Storm addresses the spatial dimension of the aforementioned 
characteristics. The impacts of carbon emissions are not restricted to the area around the source 
(dispersion). Multiple agents contribute to the problem (fragmentation of agency). Finally, there 
is no global mechanism of accountability to enforce climate decisions (institutional inadequacy).  
Gardner observes that the most ubiquitous themes in climate ethics are tied to Hardin’s 
“Tragedy of the Commons,” which advocates regulation via “mutual coercion, mutually agreed 
upon,” and the Prisoner’s Dilemma whereby scientific uncertainty, self-interest, and the 
embedding of culture may prevent individual actors from responding appropriately.13 He also 
points out that developing nations are poorly equipped to hold responsible parties accountable. 
Moreover, if a developed state were to acknowledge the need for global cooperation on climate 
change, they may be required to capitulate responsibility towards other global issues like poverty 
or inequity—an admission few developed nations seem ready to make. 
In addition to spatial variables, there are temporal variables to address in climate change 
ethics. Hence, Gardner calls the second storm the Intergenerational Storm. Gardner observes that 
climate change is a “severely lagged phenomenon.”14 CO2 may stay in the upper atmosphere 
anywhere from 5 to 35,000 years.15 The effects are back-loaded and deferred. Thus,  today’s 
conditions are largely the responsibility of previous generations, and present contributions will 
likely only affect future generations—who may or may not ever exist. This situation presents a 
temporal dispersion problem and a temporal fragmentation of agents responsible for addressing 
the climate problem. Temporally fragmented agents cannot work in unison and must act on faith 
that their counterparts in future generations will act in accordance to plans set in motion by 
previous generations. Gardner warns that it is likely that present leaders are biased towards the 
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interests of present generations. This bias for the present leads to an iteration of effects and 
policy failures over time, whereby today’s inaction will affect additional future generations that 
may or may not be spared. Moreover, future generations will be faced with the same ethical 
conundrums present generations face.   
Finally, Gardner addresses an additional form of inadequacy, which combined with the 
spatial and temporal storms, leaves humanity on the precipice of a very slippery ethical slope. 
The final storm Gardner addresses is that of “theoretical ineptitude.”16 Gardner does not go into 
specifics but asserts that even our best theoretical models do not handle the future very well. At 
least two aspects of modern culture are at play. First, despite great scientific advances, predicting 
future events with certainty and specificity is still beyond reach. Secondly, human evolution has 
engendered little capacity to sense slow-moving processes, and the instant-gratification culture of 
modern society has compounded deficiencies in long-term thinking.  
Given these challenges, Gardner’s final commentary addresses the high possibility of 
moral corruption in the face of climate change. Leaders may engage in strategies of distraction, 
complacency, unreasonable doubt, selective attention, delusion, pandering, false witness, and 
hypocrisy. Gardner observes that many of these strategies are already at play—particularly 
selective attention. Policy-makers tend to emphasize the challenges presented by the Global 
Storm, thus, present generations miss the ethical implications of the Intergenerational Storm and 
Institutional Inadequacy completely. It seems with each subsequent generation that current 
governments are doing their best to mitigate climate change, given the anarchic international 
situation, but in reality, this situation allows the metaphorical “can” to be kicked down the road 
iteratively. However, there is far more to this ethical narrative.  
While Gardner observes the ethical challenges of climate change more generally, ethicists 
Ian Smith and Robert Attfield examine the issue on an individual and/or mediated scale. Most of 
the present discourse on climate ethics, Kyoto in particular, focuses on the accountability and 
responsibility of states. What about individual actors? Ian Smith expands Gardner’s observations 
and explores Attfield’s attempt to define individual culpability to climate change.17 Attfield 
argues for mediated responsibility between individuals, an argument that could easily be 
extended to include mediated culpability of collective actors such as corporations or businesses. 
He employs a model called the “Harmless Torturer” to assign mediated responsibility. In the 
case of the Harmless Torturer, 1,000 torturers turn 1,000 dials. Each click of the dial does not 
inflict a noticeable amount of pain on the tortured. However, the cumulative effect causes a great 
amount of pain.18 The Harmless Torturer model argues there is mediated responsibility due to the 
combined effects of each individual’s actions. Attfield further applies this model to GHG 
emissions and climate change. Although Attfield’s work does not address corporations or other 
collective entities specifically, it is arguably applicable.  
However, Smith argues it is inappropriate to apply Attfield’s model to the corporate 
model. In doing so, Smith makes a strong argument against consequentialism, because in the acts 
of any particular individual in the Harmless Torturer model, the effects are not bad. However, 
Smith also cites Derek Parfit saying, “mistakes in moral mathematics that people can make, 
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where the mistake in question is in ignoring sets of acts while assuming that ‘if some act is right 
or wrong because of its effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular act.’”19 
Essentially, Parfit is pointing out that singular actions which contribute to a collective harm may, 
in fact, be wrong actions. 
Smith makes four central arguments against the mediated responsibility of corporations 
and/or individuals. First, not all GHG effects are negative, so there are problems with defining 
these emissions as “bad.” Secondly, carbon emission acts are not malicious as in the Harmless 
Torturer and therefore cannot be considered “wrong.” He also questions whether corporations 
are moral entities. Finally, he observes Gardner’s intergenerational ethics problem considering 
that current climate effects are due to CO2 that was dispersed long ago.20  
The first two arguments are relatively self-explanatory, albeit incomplete. However, the 
question as to whether corporations are moral entities and Gardner’s deferment problem require 
more examination. Essentially, Smith argues that corporations do not have “belief-desire,” and as 
a consequence cannot act as moral entities or be held culpable for their GHG activities.21 
Secondly, because of Gardner’s deferment problem, any GHGs that individuals or corporations 
produce will not harm existing people—if anything, they will harm future people that may or 
may not exist. Therefore, their responsibility for the harms of these GHGs is in question. As an 
example, Smith demonstrates that corporations are currently not held legally liable for GHG 
emissions because of an inability to find persons who have been harmed by their emissions. He 
also points out that GHGs have never been classified as a pollutant in the ethical sense, because 
water vapor is also a GHG. He states, “I am quite confident, we do not want to admit that water 
is a pollutant.”22 However, there are several problems with Smith’s position on individual 
culpability. 
Smith illustrates a variety of important ethical issues associated with climate change; 
however, his final analysis is problematic for several reasons. (1) Most of us are now aware of 
the eventual harm of GHG emissions. Therefore maliciousness may apply. (2) There are 
positives to every action though CO2 benefits do not negate the harm entirely. (3) Corporations 
act as collective consciousness. It could be argued that the operations of varying opinions on a 
shareholder board do not differ substantially from the cognitive functions of an individual mind. 
Therefore, corporations may indeed have beliefs and desires. (4) Anything in excess could be 
considered a pollutant. In a flood, homes are “polluted” with water. However, Smith rightly 
points out the intergeneration problem. It is difficult to assess culpability for harm to individuals 
who do not yet and may not ever exist. For answers to these questions, ethicists must look at a 
broader spectrum of ethical lenses. 
Ultimately, addressing or not addressing climate change has economic, social, and 
environmental costs. A central question in ethical discourse asks who is responsible for paying 
these costs. Many models have been designed to work out a distribution of burden, and while the 
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specifics of these models will not be discussed here, the ethical framework upon which they are 
based will be examined.  
Edward Page examines three current methodologies of distributing the burdens of climate 
change: The Oxfam Model, The Caney Model, and the Global GFI Model.23 Each model weighs 
“ability-to pay” and responsibility variables to assign a burden percentage to each nation. By 
exploring these models, Page offers a review of the factors at play when deciding burden 
attribution. Additionally, Page offers a duty-based ethic. Page works from the assumption made 
by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that climate 
change should be dealt with in the Kyoto model of “common but differentiated responsibilities 
[CBDR].”24 The United Nations seems to believe that all serious ethical models presently put 
forth point to the ultimate conclusion of CBDR with only philosophical novelty separating any 
one approach. However, Page argues that the differences in philosophical basis have strong 
bearing on the appropriateness and outcome of a given burden model.  
First, Page asserts that current GHG emissions by countries only reveal a portion of their 
responsibility. Because GHGs are cumulative, much of the climate harm was caused by people 
who are no longer alive, as explained by Gardner. This raises the question: should current 
generations carry that burden? There is also the problem of future contributions to the problem 
demonstrated by developing and transitional nations. As a model for attributing burden, Page 
identifies two paths: strict liability and conditional liability. Page defines “strict liability” as 
liability stemming from a nation unknowingly causing climate harm, while “conditional liability” 
stems from knowingly causing harm.25 Depending on whether an ethical system places burden 
on a society for harms caused unknowingly, these two factors provide the starting dates for 
recording burden liability in different temporal locations. The first is the start of the industrial 
revolution and the other around 1992 when climate change was understood to be “real.” This 
question of “when” a society’s GHG emissions become that society’s burdens has the potential 
to dramatically alter the burden attributed to a particular state and the responsibility landscape, as 
a whole. 
 There is also a flip-side to the burden question that asks not “who has contributed GHGs 
and how much?” but “who has benefited from these GHG emissions?” Page identifies the issue 
of “non-identity” in assigning culpability to present generations.26 This proposal, a subset of the 
“beneficiary pays” philosophy, argues that present people are beneficiaries of GHG emissions as 
they would not exist at all were it not for industrialization. Therefore, their very existence 
implies a share in the burden of mitigating climate harms. Even so, this factor is further 
complicated by the “non-reciprocity problem,” whereby beneficiaries never agreed to receive 
benefit contingent on a moral debt owed to their contemporaries that did not benefit.27 While the 
present generation may owe their existence and wealth to GHG emissions, they did not 
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knowingly enter into a beneficiary agreement to pay a future debt for this benefit, thereby 
making it very difficult to assign culpability to them.  
 Yet another factor considered by Page is the “ability to pay.” Page is looking for causal 
responsibility, beneficiary responsibility, and the ability to pay in any viable burden model. He 
examines various approaches: egalitarianism which he argues unfairly asks the wealthy to “level 
down” to universal poverty, prioritarianism which is the current paradigm of capitalism and is 
increasing the inequity gap, and the distributive ideal of sufficiency which holds that “benefits 
and burdens should be distributed so that people have the sufficient capacity to pursue the values 
they care about.”28 He does not prescribe a particular “ability-to-pay” model. Conversely, he 
argues that the appropriateness of a model is dependent on other factors.  
Page suggests that different distributive principles might hold sway on different 
geographic scales. He also suggests that the model of distributing responsibility amongst 
countries discounts the non-contributors (poor individuals) and major contributors/beneficiaries 
(rich individuals) within a country. Moreover, he advises that the methodology used to identify 
responsible parties and the model used to calculate burden should remain separate. Of the three 
models under examination, he found the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR) model to be 
both philosophically and pragmatically legitimate, mainly because it accounts for both national 
and individual responsibility and all the other factors previously mentioned.29 Still, he finds that 
there is no single principle or approach at present that works completely. 
Each of the ethical explorations up to this point consider climate change an issue of 
ethical economics or pragmatism, but there are additional perspectives to consider. Eleanor 
Brown argues that a proper framework for dealing with climate change will entail both market 
and moral forces.30 Her argument is substantiated with anecdotal and intuitive evidence implying 
that most of society agrees that they have a moral responsibility to the environment. She also 
argues that this common morality is best expressed at the community level. Her position is 
ultimately a mixture of natural law and virtue.  
Brown advocates a new paradigm towards the earth’s air and international waters under 
the auspices of a new concept of the commons. She argues that Hardin’s Tragedy of the 
Commons Model is a false dichotomy between free-markets and regulations. Both of these 
extremes have problems: regulations are difficult to administer, while free-markets, focused on 
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short term gain, do not always engender long-term stewardship. She notes, “the increasing shift 
toward privatization of things which humanity once thought irreducible to exclusive ownership, 
reflects, at best, a misguided confidence in imperfect markets, and at worst, an exercise by the 
powerful to further concentrate wealth and control of precious global resources”31 On the other 
hand, she cites the tendency of society to harm the publically-held commons when there is no 
self-interested owner to grant the environment a commodity value, as noted by Hardin. As a 
result, Brown advocates a hybrid model of responsibility. She demonstrates this model by 
building a continuum based on the ancient Roman land law that divides earth’s resources. This 
continuum begins with things divinely ordained to all people and ends with actual private 
property. In between, there are various hybrid states of land ranging from stewarded (semi-
private) to conserved land (regulated commons). While not addressing climate issues specifically 
or prescriptively, Brown offers a useful perspective on the global commons involved in the 
climate change predicament. Another of Brown’s contemporaries, Menno Kamminga, offers 
even more insight beyond the typical economic and pragmatic arguments.  
Ethics do not exist in a vacuum. There are many other factors to consider for an ethical 
system to exist beyond the realm of thought experiments. Kamminga argues that the ‘modes of 
moral discourse’ framework, devised by James Gustafson, is a valuable addition to the climate 
ethics discourse.32 He particularly looks at Kyoto. Gustafson’s four modes include: ethical, 
prophetic, narrative, and policy. Kamminga’s goal is to highlight the insufficiency of purely 
ethical modes of attributing responsibility and mitigation of climate change. Such an endeavor 
disregards political and cultural realities. His argument suggests a different kind of pluralist 
approach, “climate ethics that is pluralist: broad and interdisciplinary, yet presumably also 
conflictual and tragic.”33 He argues that a pragmatic and actionable ethical system must fit 
amongst the varied structures of politics, identity, and culture. He also insists that such a model 
must be ethically viable, whether or not climate skeptics are correct.  
Kamminga observes that ethical discourse, as found in deontology and consequentialism, 
insists that rational methodology be developed that appropriately describes a moral basis for 
tackling climate change.  However, he argues that such a discourse alone cannot tackle the 
problem in a ‘real world’ situation. The various forms of ethical discourse as mentioned in other 
literature might delineate responsibilities based on “ability to pay,” “aiding the worst off,” or 
“the greatest happiness principle.”34 However morally and ethically sound these utilitarian and 
deontological theories, there is no guarantee of nations working together to adopt them.  
Kamminga provides several examples of non-ethics based criticism of ethical 
methodologies towards climate change. For instance, narrative discourse reveals a criticism that 
ethical discourse assumes a world community “that does not, cannot (and perhaps should not) 
exist.”35 From a policy perspective, following ethical theory might be deemed revolutionary, 
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because “states are agents of local rather than global justice,” and it stands to reason that taking 
actions against state interests in the name of global interests could be considered treasonous.36 
By revealing the criticisms of these alternate modes or lenses, Kamminga opens the door to a 
broader climate discourse. Kamminga’s narrative discourse takes into account the morality of 
national identities and cultural stories. Narrative discourse finds that morality only exists within 
communities and that the “nation remains the largest social unit compatible with notably 
redistributive sacrifices for others.”37 He does, however, note the potential of altering national 
narratives, as Al Gore’s work on climate change has done, towards developing community-based 
climate solutions. However, narrative discourse has limitations in the realm of policy and 
international cooperation.  
Policy discourse, on the other hand, “asks what is desirable within the limits of the 
possible.”38 This discourse also acknowledges that human action is rarely driven by a concern 
with ethics. While moral considerations certainly influence individual and collective behavior, 
self-interest seems the more persistent consideration particularly at scales larger than the family, 
community, or state. Policy must demonstrate results based on concrete actions which benefit the 
state. However, on the international stage, governance is anarchic making policy difficult if not 
impossible. Policy is also constrained by the “actual moral foundation of the contemporary 
climate regime.”39 Regimes such as Kyoto are still devised along the status quo morality of 
industrialization and growth. Kyoto itself, the author insists, was a “small miracle.”40  
Finally, Kamminga’s prophetic discourse comes in two flavors—indictment and green 
politics. Indictment is a criticism of the status quo and its root causes. “It shows dramatically 
how far human society has fallen from what it should be.”41 The indictment discourse is most 
apparent in apocalyptic and utopian environmental narratives.  Then, there is green politics 
which focuses on a shift away from anthropocentrism to biocentrism or ecocentrism, 
decentralization, and limits on growth. Current approaches to climate change are criticized by the 
green politics lens for being overly anthropocentric as in the Brundtland Report or overly 
accepting of the status quo as in most of the modern environmentalism movement. In the green 
politics discourse, new political arrangements range widely from anarchy to world government.  
Ultimately, each of these narrative lenses must be taken into account when devising an 
ethical framework—for it may be unethical to create a framework that will never be used and 
never help anyone. To this degree, Kamminga notes the usefulness of the prophetic lens. He 
points out that it is unlikely that Kyoto will meet its goals. Basic values must change, and there 
lies the role of the prophetic lens. Green politics, while idealistic and limitedly useful in the 
current regime, provides a vision for what society ought to be. However, it fails the 
incrementalism test of policy. These value shifts require too much speed. Kamminga insists that 
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“climate ethics should become pluralist by making room for all four perspectives with their 
shared yet different articulations of climate morality and promoting critical interactivity between 
them for the purposes of mutual recognition and limitation.”42 Kamminga’s prescription is 
optimistic and lofty, indeed.  
Each of the insights shared by the various ethicists recounted in this paper represents a 
portion of what must be considered as society moves forward to address climate change. Issues 
of “who should pay” and “who can pay” will likely continue to complicate the task of 
establishing an effective international climate regime. Still, it seems that something must be 
done. It is encouraging that such an admirable amount of intellectual muscle has been put to the 
task of determining what the “right” way to proceed is. However, in lieu of or in spite of a 
common ethical compass across nations, it is time to put actual muscle to the task of mitigating 
climate change. If not, no one may be around to discuss whether it was handled ethically or not! 
The challenges ahead are daunting. It seems they will reveal our innermost divisions of identity, 
ideology, and economy. It is likely that in the process, some will bear unreasonable burden, and 
some will shoulder unreasonable consequences. But most importantly, it is possible that in 
addressing these challenges, humanity may finally put to bed old divisions and antiquated 
notions of isolation and independence—or it may not, for which it is possible that the 
consequence will be most dire. Still, international regimes such as Kyoto are heartening. Such an 
international treaty, whatever its faults, indicates an understanding of a common interest and an 
acknowledgement of at least some universal values. In studying the ethics of climate change, 
humanity has tapped into the most fundamental of questions—who are we and what do we stand 
for? How we answer these questions, will likely diffuse into every aspect of our ethical lives 
from here to perpetuity.  
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